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Abstract: 
The Senior Managers Regime came into effect in March 2016. It is expected to change the 
behaviours of senior bank managers and transform the culture of banks through individual 
accountability and sanctions for non-compliance. However, without due consideration to the 
leader-follower dynamics, it is difficult to see how law reforms could compel a cultural shift in 
banks beyond superficial compliance. 
 
Introduction: 
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008-9 and successive bank scandals in the United 
Kingdom had far-reaching adverse effects on the economy and the wider socio-political 
landscape. Distrust and dissatisfaction amongst the British public of banks were widespread as 
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the negative impact of the economic crisis affected many compelling the government to take 
action. 
In the summary Report by the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards (the 
Report), it states that:  
Too many bankers, especially at the most senior levels, have operated in an environment 
with insufficient personal responsibility. Top bankers dodged accountability for failings 
on their watch by claiming ignorance or hiding behind collective decision-making. They 
then faced little realistic prospect of financial penalties or more serious sanctions 
commensurate with the severity of the failures with which they were associated. 
Individual incentives have not been consistent with high collective standards, often the 
opposite.4 
Thus, it is obvious that legislators are determined to rein in senior bank managers and make them 
accountable for any future failings. The Report also went on note that: 
Proponents of corporate governance solutions can be prone to overestimate the benefit 
that their particular favoured measure will provide. Structural or procedural changes to 
bank boards would not have prevented the last crisis and will not prevent the next one. 
Nevertheless, the Commission has a number of proposals which, taken together, we 
believe will help to bring about a desirable change in the culture and overall approach of 
boards.5 
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From the statement, it is abundantly clear that the legislators were not convinced that reforms to 
corporate governance or change in leadership is going to alter the bad behaviours of those who 
manage and govern the banks. Something more profound and rigorous was needed. 
According to the Chief Executive Officer of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), 
Andrew Bailey, 
Culture matters a great deal. However, culture is not a tangible thing that can be taken 
down from a shelf and inspected.  Culture is a way of doing things and a set of attitudes 
that determine behaviour by everyone involved in the organisation. It is shaped by many 
influences – incentive structures, risk management, the effectiveness of management and 
governance – all of which are examined by FCA supervisors in the firms we regulate. 6 
Furthermore, Jonathan Davidson the Director of Supervision of the FCA said that, 
Changing culture is very difficult and we know it takes time. Why is this? It’s because 
culture comes from the past. CEOs, boards, programmes, systems and controls come and 
go regularly. Mindsets are developed and reinforced over years and even decades and are 
passed down from one generation to the next… So, the stakes are high and we are and 
will be paying very close attention to the culture of firms and what boards and 
management are doing to shape the culture, of which governance is a key factor.7 
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Annual Culture and Conduct Forum for the Financial Services Industry in London, 12 July 2016) 
<https://www.fca.org.uk/news/speeches/getting-culture-and-conduct-right-role-regulator>. 
Therefore, the regulatory solution was to introduce new stringent measures to provoke change 
and alter the behaviours of senior bank managers. In essence, the reforms are aimed primarily at 
reining in the leadership of banks and the financial services sector. However, there are very few 
studies, in leadership terms, of the cause of why senior bank managers behaved badly. 
One exception is a study by Kerr and Robinson’s in their assessment of the Scottish 
financial sector’s ‘tartan mafia’ that, ‘[t]raditionally shared a class habitus and shared social 
cultural capital inculcated through education, military service and sports, pastimes and 
membership.’8 This emphasises notions of likeness and the difficulty in changing leader 
behaviours. In relation to this, the former Dean of Henley Business School, Christopher Bones 
describes the legacy of a leadership generation which dominated business, politics and the 
media. In ‘The Cult of the Leader: A Manifesto for More Authentic Business’, Bones provides 
compelling arguments related to what was wrong with leaders:9 
1. The current leadership crop is a generation whose values were driven by a desire 
to be seen as successful. They embraced the trappings of success as self-promotion. They 
were deemed worth it because of the idea of leadership perfection and the shortage of 
leadership talent.  
2. McKinsey’s 1990’s ‘war for talent’ argued that talent was limited and 
organizations competed for it by recruiting the best and paying them accordingly. This 
was apparent in banking and financial services but the public sector also fell into this 
trap.  
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3. Leaders used these arguments to push for a greater share of profits as the power of 
the real owners of capital in businesses declined. Bones argues that remuneration 
reporting and approval be compulsory and earnings ratios across businesses be reported. 
Therefore, the factors that drive leadership and the climate in which they operate are far more 
fluid than what the law envisages and stipulates. More fundamentally, the disciplines of law and 
leadership stem from different assumptions about the human psyche, behavioral tendencies and 
how social norms are molded. As such, the efficacy of the recent law reforms could be open to 
question. 
According to Maak and Pless responsible leadership can be construed as a, ‘values-based 
and principle-driven relationship between leaders and stakeholders who are connected through a 
shared sense of meaning and purpose through which they raise to higher levels of motivation and 
commitment for achieving sustainable value creation and responsible change’.10 However, issues 
such as, the locus of responsible leadership, in terms of level and distribution of power, the kinds 
of behaviours and activities that would distinguish responsible leadership from other forms of 
leadership, and the extent to which one can influence the purpose of business within a tightly 
structured institutional framework of global capitalism are not directly addressed in the recent 
bank reforms.  
 Whilst the recent reforms in the United Kingdom had endeavoured to transform the way 
financial services sector do business, the focus of this paper is to examine the legal and 
leadership dimensions of regulating bank culture. A key feature of the reforms is to empower the 
regulators to intervene and regulate bank leadership so as to prevent similar failures from the 
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GFC and recent scandals from repeating. However, the notion of regulating culture is a novel 
one as culture is a complex social phenomenal. It is thus fitting to re-examine how recent law 
reforms anticipate the behaviour of senior bank managers would change and the culture of banks 
to be transformed. 
 
The Regulation of Culture via the Concept of Legal Accountability: 
Early in April 2013, the then Director of Supervision of the FCA, Clive Adamson said that, 
In many cases, where things have gone wrong, whether it is mis-selling of PPI or in 
attempting to manipulate LIBOR, a cultural issue is at the heart of the problem. It is fair 
to say that to many in the outside world, the cultural approach of doing the right thing has 
been lost for financial services. It is clear to us, therefore, particularly as a conduct 
regulator, that the cultural characteristics of a firm are a key driver of potentially poor 
behaviour... For us, we [FCA] view culture through the lens of what matters to us as a 
conduct regulator. This means an effective culture is one that supports a business model 
and business practices that have at their core, the fair treatment of customers and 
behaviours that do not harm market integrity.11 
It is clear that the FCA views culture as a contributing factor to why banks behaved badly. 
Andrew Bailey, who was then the Chief Executive of the Prudential Regulation Authority said in 
his speech in May 2016 that, ‘Culture has thus laid the ground for bad outcomes, for instance 
where management are so convinced of their rightness that they hurtle for the cliff without 
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questioning the direction of travel.’12 However, before exploring how the FCA regulates the 
culture of banks, it is pertinent to discuss what culture is and whether culture can be regulated. 
Freiberg writes that, “Culture’ is a social phenomenon and can be understood as ‘learned 
knowledge, belief, art, morals, law and custom’ in society. It is a powerful force that may 
determine the development and operation of a regulatory system.’13 From this statement, it is 
evident that culture is a social norm rather than a set of written rules. This in turn is a challenge 
for regulators or even legislators to draft a set of rules to regulate a social phenomenon.  
This does not mean that law and culture exist in isolation from each other. The law can 
help to shape culture, and as such be perceived as a product of a social construction,14 or a 
creature of culture.15 Culture also plays a role in voluntary compliance of the law by supporting 
moral congruence, motivating adherence and reducing deviancy.16 However, internal 
contradictions between competing values may provoke discord or contest for dominance, and as 
such is hierarchical, dynamic and fluid.17 Therefore, the relationship between the law and culture 
is a complex one that is not easy to untangle into a neat set of statutory statements.18 Andrew 
Bailey also reinforced that, 
As regulators, we are not able, and should not try, to determine the culture of firms.  We 
cannot write a regulatory rule that settles culture.  Rather, it is the product of many 
things, which regulators can influence, but much more directly which firms themselves 
                                                          
12 Andrew Bailey, ‘Culture in financial services – a regulator’s perspective’ (Speech at the at the City Week 2016 
Conference on 9 May 2016) <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2016/901.aspx>. 
13 Arie Freiberg, The Tools of Regulation (The Federation Press, 2010) 104. 
14 Helen Stacy, Postmodernism and Law: Jurisprudence in a Fragmenting World (Ashgate, 2001) 57.  
15 Sionaidth Douglas-Scott, Law after Modernity (Hart Publishing, 2013) 4. 
16 Christopher Hodges, Law and Corporate Behaviour: Integrating Theories of Regulation, Enforcement, 
Compliance and Ethics (Hart Publishing, 2015) 35. 
17 Fiona Haines, The Paradox of Regulation: What Regulation Can Achieve and What it Cannot (Edward Elgar, 
2011) 45-6. 
18 Sionaidth Douglas-Scott, Law after Modernity (Hart Publishing, 2013) 383. 
can shape.  We seek to ensure that firms have robust governance, which includes 
appropriate challenge from all levels of the organisation; and promote the acceptance that 
not all news can be good and the willingness to act on and respond promptly to bad 
news.19 
Thus, the FCA sees the bolstering of good governance as critical to changing the banks’ culture. 
Furthermore, Jonathan Davidson adds that, 
The first factor shaping culture is ‘tone from the top’. As Gandhi advised: ‘be the change 
that you want to see in the world’. We are therefore very interested to understand how 
leaders are role modelling the professed culture… So, the role of all leaders is to 
encourage a culture of personal responsibility and impress upon all staff the value of 
good culture to the health of the firm and the FS [Financial Services] industry more 
widely.20 
The introduction of individual accountability is central to the FCA’s strategy to embed a culture 
of personal responsibility within the banking sector.21 Accountability is well tested area of the 
law. The term accountability can be characterized, ‘[a]s a process whereby individuals are 
required to explain or justify their decisions or acts to another person or body in accordance with 
certain criteria, and then to make amends for any fault or error.’22 Accordingly, decisions made 
by individuals who are bound by accountability rules must be able to be justified, explained and 
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subjected to scrutiny.23 Legal accountability involves an imposition of liabilities for failures in 
performing one’s prescribed and proscribed set of mandated responsibilities.24 Further, if 
accountability is made difficult because the task of allocating responsibility or culpability for 
collective decisions is difficult to identify with great certainty,25 then a simple remedy is to 
stipulate a narrow set of responsibilities for individuals.  
Such regulatory strategy suggests that the rules are drafted on factual predication prone to 
be either under or over inclusive.26 These rules are inclined to be generalized regulatory 
measures dealing with a range of events and abstractions based on past and futuristic scenarios, 
with tendencies to oversimplify the complexities associated with decision making in a dynamic 
or even volatile environment.27 Furthermore, these regulatory instruments are also known as 
command control type rules that might have peripheral influence on the attitudes and values of 
the targeted group of regulated individuals.28 Empirical research has shown that the proliferation 
of laws failed to deter or have a deterrent effect on corporate misconduct or white-collar 
crimes.29 As such, strengthening accountability through the imposition of more or stricter legal 
obligations might not yield the desired outcomes of what legislators and regulators intended. 
This does not negate the fact that imposing more stringent accountability measures create the 
perception that regulatory measures are in place to improve supervision of bank staff and 
discipline those in charge, if misconduct occurred under their watch. 
More important is how the debate on regulating the culture going to impact banks? This 
goes into the heart of the matter - the goals and strategies of financial regulation. Principally, the 
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purpose of financial regulation is to assist markets with the aim to achieve efficiency.30 However, 
such regulatory aim only holds if, ‘[t]he various conditions associated with the existence of 
perfectly competitive markets are fulfilled… [t]he allocation of resources resulting from 
perfectly competitive markets is ‘Pareto optimal’’.31 Even if the premises do not hold, 
intervention to correct market failures is justifiable for the sake of financial stability, limiting the 
effects of negative externalities and the prevention of future misconduct.32 The failures of banks 
from the GFC experience and the scandals warranted intervention by the government. This took 
the form of the introduction of the SMR. As Andrew Bailey said, ‘Responsibility, as embedded 
in the Senior Managers Regime, is therefore an important hook to assist in firms’ shaping their 
own culture, and also to provide regulators with the powers to conduct supervisory oversight and 
to act when needed.’33 
 
Strengthening Legal Accountability via the New Senior Managers Regime: 
Again, referring to the Report, it states that: 
The Commission envisages a new approach to sanctions and enforcement against 
individuals:  
 all key responsibilities within a bank must be assigned to a specific, senior individual. 
Even when responsibilities are delegated, or subject to collective decision making, that 
responsibility will remain with the designated individual;  
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 the attribution of individual responsibility will, for the first time, provide for the full use 
of the range of civil powers that regulators already have to sanction individuals. These 
include fines, restrictions on responsibilities and a ban from the industry;  
 the scope of the new licensing regime will ensure that all those who can do serious 
harm are subject to the full range of civil enforcement powers. This is a broader group 
than those to whom those powers currently extend;  
 in a case of failure leading to successful enforcement action against a firm, there will be 
a requirement on relevant Senior Persons to demonstrate that they took all reasonable 
steps to prevent or mitigate the effects of a specified failing. Those unable to do so would 
face possible individual enforcement action, switching the burden of proof away from the 
regulators; and  
 a criminal offence will be established applying to Senior Persons carrying out their 
professional responsibilities in a reckless manner, which may carry a prison sentence; 
following a conviction, the remuneration received by an individual during the period of 
reckless behaviour should be recoverable through separate civil proceedings.34 
It is evident that the government empowers the regulators to not only regulate senior managers 
with stringent and demanding measures, if bank staffers behaved badly they will be held 
answerable. As such, these senior bank managers do not just work for the banks and their 
shareholders, the regulatory oversight under the SMR equips the regulators with the power of not 
only intervening in the governance and operations of the banks, but also to hold these individuals 
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Commission on Banking Standards, Volume 1: Summary, and Conclusions and recommendations’ 12 June 2013, 10 
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personally liable for their decisions, indecisions, actions or inactions, as well as others under 
their supervision. 
 The Report was also very critical of the previous regulatory measures, the Approved 
Persons Regime (APR) as being too broad and insufficiently focused on senior management.35 
Furthermore, the Report highlighted, ‘[t]he lack of clarity of responsibilities of individuals at 
senior level’, and ‘[t]here were gaps in the regulators’ enforcement powers’.36 The wordings if 
the ‘Statements of Principles’ were constructed in such a way gave management too much 
leeway in terms of interpretation.37 It also seems to encourage management to demarcate their 
responsibilities to satisfy themselves that their responsibilities had been met without looking 
further.38 This led Bagge to note that, ‘There is a real danger that potential gaps in the firm’s 
systems and controls may develop which will not be identified, although they may have been 
caught by a flexible system.’39 Andrew Bailey adds that, ‘Responsibility, as embedded in the 
Senior Managers Regime, is therefore an important hook to assist in firms’ shaping their own 
culture, and also to provide regulators with the powers to conduct supervisory oversight and to 
act when needed.’40 
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 The SMR became effective on 7th March 2016 for banks including building societies, 
credit unions, PRA-designed investment firms and UK branches of overseas banks.41 The 
legislative framework for the SMR can be found in the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 
2013 that was consolidated in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA). The senior 
management functions were stipulated in section 59 of the FSMA. Section 60 of the FSMA 
created statements of responsibilities for senior management. This includes vetting and approval 
being required by the regulators.42 The regulators also have the power to vary the approval of 
senior managers.43 More importantly, the FSMA delegated the power to make detailed rules of 
the SMR to the FCA and PRA.44  
 The emphasis of the SMR rules is to increase the onus on individual accountability with 
the introduction of statutory duties for the senior managers of banks.45 In particular, requiring 
senior managers, [t]o take reasonable steps to prevent regulatory breaches from occurring, or 
continuing to occur, in their area of responsibility.’46 Further, the regulators introduce specific 
‘prescribed responsibilities’ which must be allocated amongst ‘Senior Management Functions’. 
This is where each senior manager will be allocated responsibilities by the bank, and if the 
responsibilities are shared, each senior manager will be wholly accountable for it.47 The 
regulators also require banks to record their key governance arrangements in a ‘Management 
Responsibilities Map’ describing the bank’s management and governance arrangements 
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including the key reporting lines, committee structures and details about key management and 
their responsibilities.48 ‘Senior Management Functions’ also need to complete individual 
‘Statements of Responsibilities’ that clearly sets out the role they are undertaking and describing 
those areas of the bank for which they are responsible.49 All of which denotes that senior bankers 
must ensure they have full control over their areas of responsibility, everything senior managers 
do or not do must be defensible with evidence to support those decisions.50  
Senior management would be occupied with creating a paper trail of justifications or 
explanation about satisfying their legal duties rather than the job of managing the affairs of a 
bank like a business entity, in effect making banks more like quasi-governmental entities with 
the threat of prosecution or at least, possible regulatory scrutiny constantly on the minds of the 
executives. In particular, senior bank managers have to ensure whether everything they did or did 
not do at work satisfy the legal test of taking reasonable steps to prevent regulatory breaches 
from occurring under their watch or continue to occur.51 This would also involve taking 
reasonable steps to effectively control their area of business responsibilities, to monitor the 
delegated responsibilities, and at the same time, ensure those under them complied with all 
regulatory requirements.52 Such regulatory duties would also encompass what the senior 
manager knows or ought to know, whether due diligence was exercised in every decision, any 
alternative actions he or she should have taken with proper risk assessments, and whether the 
delegated responsibilities were properly arranged, managed and monitored.53 In short, the duties 
are a non-exhaustive list of concerns and considerations to demonstrate that senior managers 
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have undertaken all reasonable steps on an ongoing basis to meet the regulatory demands of the 
SMR.54 Finally, the duty of an assigned responsible person to report to the regulators (FCA and 
PRA or either) for breaches or disciplinary actions against an employee meant that the banks are 
in effective assisting the regulators to police their staff. However, the new legal responsibilities 
are no substitute for leadership. Besides, even if the new rules put the spotlight on the behaviour 
and the decisions of senior management as well as how they manage, as noted earlier culture is a 
social norm rather than a set of written rules, therefore those who make or shape norms need to 
foster as well as nurture the right culture.  
It is important to note that the approach and mindset from a business perspective about 
‘the problem’ are quite distinct from legal solutions. This is evident in the discourse from the 
business literature. Legal remedies can only go so far to transform the culture of banks and how 
they are being managed. They need to examine business viewpoints about leadership and its 
impact on the culture of organizations.  
 
The Role of Leadership in Shaping Culture 
There is a growing clamour for evidence of more ethical behaviour amongst leaders in the 
financial arena.  This, in turn, leads to a growing demand for organizations to overtly display 
greater levels of responsibility, governance and promotion of ethical leadership to actively 
illustrate that things have changed.55 The rush towards notions such as, authentic and ethical 
leadership may have begun well before the economic crash of 2007, but nevertheless they do 
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reflect a need to seek solace in what is positive about leaders and leadership in general. However, 
in studying what makes for effective and ethical leadership we are faced with a number of 
problems. There is a growing realisation that we have failed to investigate seriously what were 
the leadership causes of the economic crash.56 This failure to explore what went wrong in 
leadership terms encourages platitudes of change. Senior leaders in politics and banking might 
talk about the need for ethical behaviours (as witnessed by Mark Carney, the Governor of the 
Bank of England, in his 2016 Mansion House speech where he pledges to end the irresponsibility 
practice that has gripped the financial sector), but we simply do not explore what this will be, 
how it will be enacted, and more importantly, who is leading the way as exemplars. This tends to 
focus attention towards notions of leadership and how leaders attempt to influence and change 
culture. 
Notions of regulation seem to be predominant, but lack overall awareness and linkage to 
the market need for change. The main shock and awe strategy that organizations use to trigger 
the leadership/follower life cycle of change is to invoke ‘the logic of the market’,57 which is a 
series of linked change mantras intent on mobilizing support for cultural change throughout the 
organization. The logic of the market suggests that unless the organization changes to adapt to 
market conditions then there is a real and present danger to the position of the organization and 
thus maintaining jobs and remuneration becomes increasingly problematic. The strategy of 
employing the logic of the market as a cultural change technology requires a leadership strategy 
to help construct a version of social reality that triggers the leadership/follower life cycle. The 
logic of the market supported by regulation and skillful and effective communication is one way 
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to do this. The logic of the market must be supported by a grand spectacle that provides the 
‘evidence’ that change is required. The current spectacle is both changing social and political 
dynamics, which threaten a sense of survival of the business and financial leaders have to 
skillfully present the case for cultural change around a change spectacle supported with the 
change mantras. If they do this successfully then staff may elect to shift their identities to follow 
if they feel it is in their interests to do so and if they also feel leadership can meet with their 
survival needs. This strategy does work but it does not provide in many cases long lasting 
sustainable cultural change.58 The preferred strategy would always be to cultivate a culture that 
has the built-in capacity for organizational learning and cultural change wired in to its meaning 
and value systems.  
Another key aspect that leadership needs to address is the notion of power and culture. 
The power of the dominant group can influence the cultural construction and performance of 
attitudes, behaviors and discourses in organizations. Managers may be aware of alternative 
cultural possibilities but feel disempowered as a result of the constraining effect of corporate 
culture.59 Cultural control may be achieved through the symbolic use of power by privileging 
particular expressive events. Expressive hegemony as a form of power has the potential of 
‘freezing’ a particular perspective on social reality. It does this by excluding alternative 
discourses. These discourses create the very possibility of cultural change by opening up for 
discussion a review of existing ideologies, practices, social/political/strategic and technological 
orientations. Appreciating the role of power, in shaping realities, is crucial in understanding the 
dynamics of cultural management which is primarily concerned with controlling the agency of 
                                                          
58 D. Buchanan, L. Fitzgerald, D. Ketley, R. Gollop, J. L. Jones, S. S. Lamont, A. Neath and E. Whitby, ‘No going 
back: A review of the literature on sustaining organizational change’, (2005) 7, International Journal of 
Management Reviews, 189–205. 
59 M. Alvesson, Understanding Organizational Culture (Sage Publications, 2002). 
employees, their identity choices, the concepts in uses and the forms of every day talk and thus 
the shaping of organizational reality perspectives. Regulatory activities can begin to shape the 
discourse of change; however, the deep-set and embedded power culture also needs to be more 
formally addressed. 
There will always be opposing forces in organizations, which may influence the outcome 
of cultural struggles. This perspective illustrates the pluralistic nature of organizations, which 
renders the perspective of an integrated culture that is based on the harmonious consensus of 
meaning highly problematic. The concept of organizations as sites of power struggles over 
meaning definitions introduces a paradigm to consider. The biased integrationist and 
functionalist approach to cultural change which is popular in the literature and both consultancy 
and managerial practice, fails to acknowledge how managerial practices reproduce and protect 
relations of power in organizations and render functionalist and regulatory change as politically 
naïve. 
The primary activity of corporate culturism is to re-engineer organizational culture 
through meaning management. The objective is to construct consensus with what is perceived as 
just, valued and therefore considered as real and worthwhile. Hegemony is concerned with 
creating management cultures where the availability of alternative value positions or 
organizational perspectives are systematically cleansed. This cleansing occurs through the 
domination of discourse and the censorship and subjugation of alternative discourses that do not 
fit the dominant narrative. Corporate culturism may not have articulated its agenda as hegemony 
but the techniques, applications and guiding theory of cultural management are concerned with 
managing the definition of reality on the part of the workforce. Corporate culturism was and 
remains fundamentally concerned with the socio-ideological control of the interpretative and 
expressive capacity of the organizational self. How managers process their inter-subjective sense 
making activities is central to understanding the dynamics of organizational and how best to 
approach cultural change interventions. This is exemplified the works of Kerr and Robinson and 
their assertion that there is greater value in considering leaders as members of an elite field with 
the concentration of power in these elite groups.60 This has a lot to do with not perceiving 
leadership as an individualistic phenomenon or as constructed along a leader/follower axis.61 
Grint sounds a note of caution concerning leadership.62  His arguments centre around socially-
constructed notions which create a sanctity around the concept of leadership and, ‘[t]herefore, we 
need to consider not how to revoke the sacred leadership of individuals (and I use the plural of 
individual as distinct from the collective – ‘group’ purposely) but how to bind those individuals 
closer to the communities they lead without requiring the community to strangle 
individualism.’63  
Thus far a brief review of the literature on leadership has made plain that the enactment 
of legal measures to hold senior bank managers individually accountable is unlikely to change 
the way they behave in a meaningful way, let alone the culture of banks. It is fair to say from a 
business perspective laws do not change culture, people do. However, this is not to claim that the 
law reform is unimportant. In fact, reforming the law denotes a change in standards of behaviour. 
The next step is to explore how leadership can inform the law to facilitate change for the better. 
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Conclusion and Commentaries: 
Recent reforms are aimed at transforming the way the financial services sector in the United 
Kingdom does business. A cornerstone of the new regulatory measures is to regulate the culture 
of banks by imposing more rules to ensure senior bank managers are accountable for their 
actions, inactions, decisions and indecisions, as well as others under their watch. Whilst this 
appears to be a neat compartmentalization of the ‘problem’, the premise of this regulatory 
prescription is that leaders have or should have absolute control of the affairs of the organization. 
However, a brief survey of the literature on leadership reveals an entirely different picture. More 
research into the dynamics and consequences of how regulations affect the leadership and in turn 
shape the culture of organizations is critical to finding practical solutions. Without meaningful 
dialogue between business viewpoints about leadership and the legal approach, it is difficult to 
see how the reforms could work in actuality beyond superficial compliance. 
With Brexit negotiations about to commence, it is even more crucial for the United 
Kingdom to bolster public assurances in financial services sector because the GFC and recent 
bank scandals have demonstrated that the combination of market uncertainty and corporate 
misconduct can create an economic crisis. This calls for robust regulations and good leadership 
to promote confidence. Therefore the answer is to strengthen legal accountability and nurture 
better leadership. 
 Another aspect of this reform that was not discussed in this paper, but warrants further 
investigation is the issue of the international elements of leadership and organizational culture. 
The SMR not only applies to banks in the United Kingdom, it is also mandatory for certain key 
executives in overseas branches. Since leadership is interpreted in different ways and in different 
lands and languages,64 it would therefore appear necessary to examine the context, ‘[t]hat both 
legitimates a particular form of action and constitutes the world in the process.’65 To accept the 
existence of worldviews means to research cultural leadership within the financial sector in a 
wider, culturally diverse perspective, understanding differing philosophic frameworks and being 
sensitive to the history and needs of different cultural communities.66 From a legal perspective 
this is even more crucial to the efficacy of the new rules as leaders in non-Western countries like 
those in Asia, would lead and run the business from a different mind-set compared to what the 
laws in the United Kingdom prescribe.67 In short, we argue that law reform is only the beginning 
of the journey to regulate the culture of banks. 
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